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        We present a procedure for evaluating ex ante the effects of alternative paths of a 
monetary policy tool (the federal funds rate in our illustrations) on output and the price 
level within a variant of a widely-used vector autoregressive model of the U.S. economy. 
This exercise is a supplement to, or even an alternative to, analysis that relies on a 
particular structural model.  Illustrations of the method are provided by evaluating the 
effects of changes in the funds rate target.  Additionally, the Taylor rule is used to 














 I.  Introduction 
One of the critical elements in the formulation of monetary policy is the evaluation of 
the effects of alternative paths of the policy instrument on the macroeconomy.  For example, in 
FOMC meetings, estimates of the effects of alternative paths of the federal funds rate are 
presented to policymakers as an input into the policy process; for a discussion see Meulendyke 
(1998).   The effects of the alternative paths are evaluated within the context of a structural 
model of the economy; the latest version of the structural model used at the Board of Governors 
is described in Brayton, Levin, Tryon, and Williams (1997). 
In this paper we present a procedure for evaluating ex ante the effects of alternative 
paths of a monetary policy tool (the federal funds rate in our illustrations) on output and the 
price level. We demonstrate this procedure employing a variant of a widely-used vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model of the U.S. economy. This exercise can be viewed as a supplement 
to, or even an alternative to, analysis that relies on a particular structural model.  Given the lack 
of general agreement on the appropriate structural model, evaluation of the effects of changes in 
the policy instrument within a variety of different types of models is appropriate.  
The discussion of the proposed procedure is in the spirit of recent work by Leeper and 
Sims (1994) who, following earlier work by Sims (1982; 1987), distinguish between normal 
policymaking and regime changes. For purposes of illustration, we employ a VAR model 
comprised of the same variables used by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (hereafter CEE) 
(1994; 1996) and Bernanke and Mihov (hereafter BM) (1998). We show how to evaluate and 
compare the current policy path with normal policy alternatives, such as typically-sized changes 
in the federal funds target. We stress that this model is used only for illustrative purposes.  Our 
methodology applies to any generic structural model and thus can easily incorporate alternative  2 
models and estimation techniques.  For instance,  the methodology is easily extended to 
alternative schemes to identify structural shocks such as those proposed by Bernanke (1986) or 
Blanchard and Quah (1989), including the adoption of prior information into the estimation. 
Finally, as argued by Sims (1987) and Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon (1984), the analysis of 
normal policymaking avoids the difficulties of the Lucas critique.  
In section II we provide a brief discussion of the VAR model.  In section III, we present 
a discussion of the econometric technique.  In section IV, we present and discuss results that 
compare the "no change" policy with alternatives in which the funds rate target is altered.  We 
conclude in section V. 
II. The VAR Model 
The model of CEE and BM comprises output (Y), the price level (P), a commodity price 
index (CP), and three reserve market variables--total reserves (TR), nonborrowed reserves 
(NBR), and the federal funds rate (FFR).
1   The analysis uses quarterly data for the period 
1959:1-1999:4.  Estimation begins in 1961:2 and ends at different points, depending on the 
policy experiment considered.  Eight quarterly lags are employed, and log levels of all variables 
except FFR are used.
2   
In performing the policy experiments, it is assumed that FFR is the policy variable.  
Monetary policy shocks, following CEE (1994; 1996) and Strongin (1995), are identified using 
a Choleski decomposition with the following ordering: Y, P, CP, TR, FFR, and NBR.  
Following Strongin (1995) and BM (1998), we assume that, because the Federal Reserve 
accommodated the demand for TR over much of the sample, shocks to TR reflect reserve 
demand shocks.  Ordering TR before FFR thus purges shocks to FFR of any effect of reserve 
demand shocks.  The decomposition implies that monetary policy shocks affect Y, P, CP, and  3 
TR only with a lag, but affect NBR contemporaneously.  It also assumes that monetary 
policymakers  respond in the current period to shocks to Y, P, CP, and TR, but respond only 
with a lag to movements in NBR.
3  
Figure 1 presents impulse response functions for the model estimated over 1961:2-
1999:4 along with associated one standard error confidence intervals for a one standard 
deviation positive shock to FFR.   The patterns of effects are similar to those reported in the 
literature, and are generally consistent with typical views of the operation of monetary policy in 
an economy with some rigidities..  The only troublesome aspect of the results, which also 
appears in the recent studies of CEE (1994; 1996), BM (1998), and Leeper and Zha (2001), is 
the puzzling, long-lived negative effect of a transitory shock to FFR on P,  which deserves 
further investigation.
4   Since we focus on illustrating how to implement our procedure, 
conditional on a widely-used specification, we leave pursuit of model refinements to future 
research.   
III.  Methodology 
       In a precursor to the current analysis, Fackler and Rogers (1995) demonstrated, in the 
context of a structural VAR, how to use “counterfactual” analysis to evaluate policy 
alternatives, terminology also used by Christiano (1998).  For present purposes, we adopt a 
more intuitive terminology used by Sims (1982) and, more recently, Leeper and Sims (1994), 
who refer to "normal policymaking."  In a recent paper, Leeper and Zha (2001) refer to 
“modest” policy interventions rather than “normal policymaking.”  These papers are compared 
to ours in Section IV, B below. 
Consider a policy feedback equation that might be embedded in a VAR such as  4 
f = α y + ε , where f is the proximate objective of policy (the federal funds rate in our exercise), 
where y is a vector of lagged endogenous variables, where α  is an appropriately-dimensioned 
vector of coefficients, and where ε  is a random structural shock, orthogonal to the other shocks 
in the model.
5  Normal policymaking is an assessment of alternative "ε -paths."  In contrast, 
regime shifts are represented by changes in one or more of the coefficients of α ; shifting to an 
interest rate peg would be one example.
6  
Our reading of the policy literature, along with assessments in the financial press, 
suggests that most policy actions represent normal policymaking.  Agents are likely aware of 
continuing debates about optimal policy both inside and outside the monetary authority.  While 
these debates, for purposes of emphasis and clarity, are often presented in terms of regime 
shifts, few shifts in policy regime seem to occur in practice. Agents may even discount 
announcements of regime shifts until the authority has pursued the new regime long enough to 
convince them that a shift has indeed occurred. 
Suppose the policymaker wants to evaluate the prospective impact on the economy of 
lowering the funds rate one-quarter percentage point below the current setting. Using the funds 
rate equation of the VAR, f = α y + ε , in normal policymaking as suggested by Leeper and Sims 
(1994, p. 91), "… one would solve for  i ε  sequences that make the time path of interest rates  
behave as desired.  Because the model implies that there are many potential stochastic 
influences on interest rates, this kind of projection is generally quite different from simply 
forecasting conditional on a given time path of the interest rate." As will be derived in equation 
(3) below, the technical expression for the moving average  representation of the model in 















where Ds is the moving average coefficient matrix associated with the structural shocks in the ε  
vector, where the second term on the right hand side is the dynamic forecast or base projection, 
and where the first term on the right hand side is the j-period-ahead forecast error.  With n 
variables in the VAR, for equation i (the policy equation, say) this forecast error is 










, ε . 
A conditional forecast, such as a particular interest rate path for several quarters, can be attained 
in a wide variety of ways by judicious selection of the elements of the ε t+j-s , s = 0,…, 
j-1, vectors; in general, there are multiple constraints for which the target path obtains.
7 As 
noted in the Leeper-Sims quote above, choosing from among these constraints is generally 
different from selecting the ε -path as described below. 
Our description of normal policymaking begins with the historical decomposition (HD), 
which quantifies, given the identification of a model, the period-by-period relative importance 
of the various structural shocks.  The HD is derived from a structural model
8: 
01 1 ... tt t p t p t yA yA y A y ε −− =+ + + +                                                                                         (1) 
In equation (1), the Ai represent the structural coefficients and the ε t are the structural shocks.  
The elements of ε t are assumed to be mutually orthogonal.  Let et = (I-A0)
-1ε t represent the 
reduced form shocks and  Π i the reduced-form coefficient matrices.  Define Π (L) = (I-Π 1L-...-
Π pL
p). The moving average matrix is given by C(L) = [Π (L) ]
-1, with C0 = I.  The moving 
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where ε t = (I-A0)et, and where Ds = Cs(I-A0)
-1.  For a particular period t+j, equation (3) may be 
written as: 
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,                                                                                        (3) 
which represents the HD.  
    Equation (3) shows an in-sample accounting identity for a model estimated through 
period t+j.  Specifically, the actual data is the sum of two terms. The second term on the right 
hand side of equation (3) is the expectation of yt+j given information available at time t, i.e., the 
base projection.  The first term on the right hand side shows the difference between the actual 
series and the base projection due to the structural innovations in the variables subsequent to 
period t.  This term shows that the gap between an actual series and its base projection is the 
sum of the (weighted) contributions of the structural innovations to the individual series in the 
analysis. 
    An immediate implication of this identity is that we can distinguish between the 
endogenous and exogenous components of policy. Consider again equation (3). Using the 
estimated parameters and residuals, suppose we constrain to zero the structural shocks in the 
policy equation (the FFR equation in our analysis). The accounting identity implies that the 
constructed (i.e., the counterfactual) path for y is the path the economy would have followed 
had all shocks except for the exogenous policy shock taken on their actual values. That is, the 
constructed path includes only the endogenous responses of the policy variable incorporated in 
the estimated feedback equation. The difference between the actual data and this constructed  7 
path represents the impact of the actual, exogenous component of policy. Note that if the values 
of the elements of the ε -path are “large” relative to the endogenous component of the policy 
equation, perhaps due to a regime shift, agents may begin to revise their expectations of the 
policy feedback rule, raising the usual problems associated with the Lucas critique. We will 
offer two types of casual evidence aimed at exploring whether the elements of the ε -path 
associated with a proposed policy alternative raise quantitatively important Lucas critique 
issues. First, we will investigate the ratio of the exogenous policy component to the value of 
FFR. Second, in the context of a relatively large number of trials using a bootstrapping 
technique, we will investigate whether the extreme values of the exogenous component lie 
outside the estimated residuals using the actual data. Note that if the exogenous policy 
interventions are small, then we will expect that evaluation of alternative policies like “raise the 
FFR target 25 basis points” to have relatively modest effects on the economy.
9  
Our primary focus is on ex ante evaluation of policy alternatives, which uses the 
accounting identity in the following way. We compute the exogenous component of policy--the 
ε -path--required to achieve the policy objective, a computation that presumes the policymaker 
takes the endogenous component of policy into account. That is, the ε -path is the size of the 
policy intervention which, when added to the endogenous response of the policy variable to the 
economy, achieves the policy objective. When the ε -path for the policy instrument is combined 
with structural shocks to the other equations, we compute the path the economy will follow if 
the values of the policy variable implicit in the ε -path are implemented. We refer to this as the 
“fundamental property” of normal policymaking. Also note that when the elements of the ε -
path are small relative to the endogenous component, as should be the case with normal 
policymaking, agents are unlikely to benefit from reassessing the systematic policy rule. This is  8 
the empirical analog to the arguments by Sims (1982; 1987) and Cooley-LeRoy-Ramon (1984) 
that with normal policymaking the Lucas critique is unlikely to be an issue. 
We use the fundamental property in out-of-sample policy analysis in the following way. 
Suppose we want to learn at time t the implications of a particular path for the policy variable T 
periods into the future; e.g., suppose we want the impact of a 25 basis point rise in FFR. 
Assume for a moment that shocks to the other equations are known over the forecast horizon. 
Using the coefficients estimated through period t, equation (3) shows the decomposition for a 
particular period, t+j, in terms of the base projections conditional on information at time t and 
the contributions of non-policy shocks subsequent to t. Consider (3) for j = l: 
  s t
s
s t t D D y − +
∞
=
+ + ∑ + = 1
1
1 0 1 ε ε . 
        t t BP D + = + 1 0ε . 
Note that the ith equation in this system, in our example representing the FFR equation, is: 
   t i
i j
t j ij t i ii t i BP d d y , , 1 1 , , 0 1 , , 0 1 , + + = ∑
≠
+ + + ε ε  
where BPk,i,t is the k-period-ahead base projection for the ith equation at time t and where dk,ij is 
the (i,j) element of matrix Dk.  To find the shock to this equation that will produce a target 
value for FFR, denoted by 
*
1 , + t i y , solve the following equation for  1 , ˆ + t i ε  
   t i t j
i j
ij t i ii t i BP d d y , , 1 1 , , 0 1 , , 0
*
1 , ˆ + + = +
≠
+ + ∑ ε ε  
the solution for which is  
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i j
ij t i t i ii t i d BP y d ε ε .
10                                                                     (4)  9 
        Proceeding in a similar manner, the structural residual needed to achieve a particular value 
for yi,t+2, denoted by 
*
2 , + t i y , is: 














ij t i t i ii t i d d d BP y d ε ε ε ε .                         (5) 
Similar iterations produce a path of structural shocks that generate a path for yi,t+j  that matches 
the desired path  
*
, j t i y + , for j = 1,...,T, where T is the planning horizon.  This path of structural 
shocks for the policy variable, combined with the values of the shocks to the other variables, 
then produces an expected path for the system as a whole.
11 
  Finally, we drop the assumption that the other equation shocks are known over the 
forecast horizon. We compute the ε -path by employing a bootstrap technique that samples with 
replacement from the estimated residuals for each equation.  Hence, we do not impose an 
arbitrary assumption about the probability density generating the residuals. For each trial, the  
fundamental property suggests that the computed values for the system variables are those the 
economy will follow under the assumed ε -path for the policy equation, given the shocks to the 
other equations.
12 
  Note that the computed value for  j t i + , ˆ ε  formalizes the description of policy formulation  
and revision described by Blinder (1997). In particular, he argues: 
 
“First, you must plan an entire hypothetical path for your policy instrument, from now 
until the end of the planning horizon, even though you know you will activate only the 
first step of the plan. It is simply illogical to make your current decision in splendid 
isolation from what you expect to do in subsequent periods. Second, when next period 
actually comes, you must appraise the new information that has arrived and make an 
entirely new multiperiod plan. If the surprises were trivial, that is, if the stochastic errors 
were approximately zero, step one of your new plan will mimic the hypothetical step 
two of your old plan. But if significant new information has arrived, the new plan will 
differ notably from the old one. Third, you must repeat this reappraisal process each and 
every period.” (p. 9) 
  10 
For each trial, we assign each element of a vector of length t+j an integer randomly drawn (with 
replacement) from the set (1,2,…,N), where N is the number of observations in the estimation. 
The first integer selected, corresponding to that particular observation in the estimation period, 
has an associated set of residuals for the nonpolicy equations. These residuals are used in the 
computation of the  1 , ˆ + t i ε  needed to attain the policy objective in period t+1. The second integer 
is associated with another set of residuals, which proxies for the new information which arrives 
that period, and so on. For each trial in our bootstrap procedure, this sequence of exogenous 
shocks to the policy variable along with the shocks to the other variables and the base 
projections are used to generate paths for the variables in the system.  Thus, each trial simulates 
arriving information to update the exogenous policy component and keep the policy variable at 
its target level. The average of the  constructed paths—the mean path—over these trials then 
represents the expected impact of the policy.
13  We take this expected path to be the focus of 
attention for monetary policymakers.   
IV. Policy Experiments 
A. General Description of the Experiments 
In this section we describe three policy simulations constructed using the methodology 
described above.  Each example is intended to characterize, at least roughly, the type of policy 
analysis undertaken in anticipation of a change in policy. Specifically, policymakers can be 
presented with comparison forecasts for the current policy relative to alternative policy options.  
The first exercise compares the actual increase in the target for FFR from 5.50% to 
6.00% in 1995:1 with a no-change policy in which the target is maintained at 5.50%. The 
second simulation analyzes the cuts in the target for FFR from 5.50% to 5.25% on September 
29, 1998, to 5.00% on October 15, 1998, and then to 4.75% in November 1998, again  11 
comparing the results to a no-change policy.  (Of course, alternative policies to the one actually 
adopted could be considered as well, but presentation of them would only clutter the graphical 
presentation below.) Third, we examine policymaking employing the Taylor rule for the 1990-
1992 period. We discuss these policy options after some general comments about the 
experiments. 
For each policy experiment we estimate the model through the period ending in the 
quarter prior to the start of the policy evaluation period.  After estimation, we compare forecasts 
for the entire system of variables for the no-change and the alternative policies based on 1000 
trials where for strict comparability, for a given trial, the non-policy shocks are the same for the 
no-change and alternative policies. Note that the no-change policy forecast is distinct from the 
standard dynamic forecast, or base projection, in that over the forecast period, FFR is 
maintained at the target level. In contrast, the base projection, which is conditional on 
information at time t and hence employs only past realized shocks in generating forecasts, 
generates a time path for FFR that generally differs from the target level.  
Estimation for each model begins with 1961:2, with values for 1959:1-1961:1 used as 
pre-sample data. For the graphical presentation, we focus on the levels (not the logs) of the 
variables in the model.
14  We do not present plots of FFR.  Such plots would only show the 
target paths described for each experiment.   
B. Comparison to Earlier Studies 
    Sims (1982), in addition to discussing normal policymaking conceptually, also presented 
related empirical work.  His empirical work assessed the plausibility of the political 
administration’s forecasts of selected macro indicators by computing alternative combinations 
of shocks to the equations of the 6-variable VAR model he used that are consistent with the  12 
administration’s forecasts.   The shocks to just the M1 money stock, short-term interest rate, 
and fiscal policy variables required to generate the real GNP and price deflator forecasts of the 
administration are also computed as are the shocks to just the money  stock and interest rate 
required to generate the forecasts.  Thus, the orientation of the counterfactual experiment is 
different from this paper. The structure of the model differs as well; in Sims’ model  M1 and 
the three-month T-bill rate comprise the monetary sector whereas the reserves market is a 
critical element of the model in this paper.   
    Likewise, Leeper and Sims (1994) presented empirical work as well as a conceptual 
discussion of normal policymaking. They estimated several models: a three variable real 
business cycle model and neoclassical and sticky-price variants of a 10 variable model. In the 
latter, a monetary policy equation that is similar to the Taylor rule is included. They evaluated 
the models for goodness-of-fit.  However, policy experiments of the type we conduct were not 
reported. 
     Christiano (1998) presented a counterfactual experiment for the Great Depression that is 
closer to what we do than the two papers just discussed.  However, due to “instrument 
instability” Christiano used a weighted average of his estimated and counterfactual residuals for 
his policy shocks, along with the historical residuals for the other equations, in his 
counterfactual analysis. Use of the estimated residuals implies that his counterfactual 
simulations are in-sample. Fackler and Rogers (1995) also conducted their analysis in-sample, 
along with the historical shocks to the other equations, though they used pure counterfactual 
residuals for the policy shocks.  
           Our analysis uses pure counterfactual residuals, is conducted out-of-sample, and draws 
random samples from the estimated residuals for use as shocks to the nonpolicy equations. In  13 
addition, we report on the extreme values of our counterfactual policy shocks. As we report 
below, we do not find evidence of instrument instability in our empirical results.               
Leeper and Zha (LZ) (2001) conducted experiments similar to ours in a variety of ways. 
First, their model included output, consumer prices, commodity prices, the funds rate, the 
unemployment rate and M2. Our use of the CEE model substitutes TR and NBR for 
unemployment and the money supply. Accordingly, the analyses differ on the relative 
advantages of a detailed specification of the market for reserves.  
Second, LZ evaluated policymaking in two historical episodes, the decline in the FFR 
target beginning in 1990 and the rise in the target in 1994-95 period. While we both evaluate 
the opening years of the 1990s, our discussion of this period focuses on the impact of 
implementing the Taylor rule at about the time it was first introduced, while theirs focuses on 
normal policymaking using the feedback rule in place. Our analyses are most similar in the 
discussion of policy alternatives in the middle years of the 1990s. In addition, we also consider 
a more recent episode, in 1998, that LZ do not. Thus, there is only a modest amount of overlap 
in the specifics of the policy analysis.  
The policy experiments presented here and in LZ begin to build a database for 
policymakers that explain how model economies respond to exogenous policy shocks. Both 
papers evaluate cases where the target for the funds rate target is rising and falling. In addition, 
this paper demonstrates how to evaluate important policy suggestions such as the Taylor rule. 
C. The 1995 Rise in the Federal Funds Rate Target 
            Gavin (1996) provides a detailed discussion of Federal Open Market Committee 
deliberations in 1995.  For our purposes, we focus on the documented rise in the FFR target to 
6% on February 1, 1995 from the target rate of 5.5% that had been in place since late 1994.   14 
Since we are using quarterly data, we model the target rate for the first quarter of 1995 as 
5.83%, the average of the 5.5% target in January with the 6% target for February and March.  
We then hold the target at 6% for another nineteen quarters in order to observe the economic 
dynamics for this policy. We do not pretend that the FOMC intended to maintain the rate at 6% 
indefinitely. Rather, we maintain the new target rate in our simulations in order to observe the 
system dynamics over a reasonably long time period. Note that our methodology does not 
require that the target rate be constant, so we could have incorporated the actual cut in the target 
to 5.75% in July 1995 into the analysis rather than holding the target at 6%. However, we are 
unaware of any evidence suggesting that the FOMC intended in February to lower the target 
rate in July. Rather, we generally interpret policy changes during this period as the committee 
seeing the need for a change in the target rate, making the change, and then observing the 
effects of the change in the economy at large prior to implementing subsequent policy actions. 
We also presume that the committee would indeed make projections of the proposed policy 
change(s) several years into the future and compare these projections with the no-change 
policy; see Reifschneider, Tetlow, and Williams (1999) as an example.  
  Figures 2 and 3 compare the impact on the non-policy variables of the no-change policy 
with the increase in the FFR target actually implemented in early 1995. This comparison 
assumes that policymakers use data through 1994:4 for estimation.
15  The expected (mean) 
paths for both the no-change and rate increase policies are plotted in Figure 2 while the 
differences between the expected paths for these alternative policies are plotted in Figure 3.  
Figure 2 thus presents estimates of the levels of the variables under each policy considered, 
while Figure 3 presents a clearer view of the magnitudes of the differences between the two 
policies.  The expected paths in Figure 2 incorporate endogenous and exogenous monetary  15 
policy actions,  the base projections, and the non-policy shocks in the computation of the paths 
in each trial.  Shocks to the non-policy variables affect all the variables in the system; for 
example, these shocks endogenously alter FFR.  Feedback from the non-policy variables to FFR 
is thus captured in the experiments.  This feedback, which is explicitly accounted for in 
equations (4) and (5), affects the size of the exogenous policy shocks.   We do not directly 
address the issue of whether the model produces forecasts that compete favorably with 
available forecasting alternatives.  
  The direction of effect of the FFR increase for each of the variables is as expected.  Y, 
P, CP, TR, and NBR all fall relative to the no-change policy.  However, we see that these 
changes are relatively small; for example, the decline in Y after twenty quarters is 
approximately $54 billion for the one-half percentage point increase considered in this 
experiment.  The small magnitude of effects is in line with simulations from structural models.  
For example, when investigating a relatively large 100 basis point change in FFR, 
Reifschneider, Tetlow, and Williams (1999) find small effects on key economic variables in a 
full-model simulation of the FRB/US structural model.   
  The small impact of the rate hike policy compared to the no-change policy is not too 
surprising since the base projections and the shocks to the non-policy variables are the same in 
both cases; the only differences are the exogenous shocks to the policy variable.  If the 
exogenous policy shocks for the two policies are similar in magnitude, then the paths  will be 
also.  This can be seen formally by comparing equations (4) and (5) for the two policies.  Let 
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policy where 
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+ + − − − = − ε ε ε ε .  The difference in the target values 
for FFR is now .5, and the difference between  
NC
t i t i 2 , 2 , ˆ ˆ + + − ε ε also reflects the previous period’s 
difference between the structural policy shocks.  The difference between the structural shocks 
for the policy change and no-change cases for longer horizons can be derived in an analogous 
fashion.  Thus, it is not too surprising that the differences in the paths of the non-policy 
variables for the policy change and no-change cases are relatively small.
17 
  The relatively small magnitude of the impact of the shocks from this technical 
perspective is consistent with our intuition about the conduct of policy. Specifically, we view 
the FOMC as operating so as to bring about marginal changes in inflationary pressure. After all, 
the Fed has available a wide array of policy options, including changes of various sizes in the 
FFR target, large changes in the discount rate, and even changes in reserve requirements. In  17 
utilizing any of these tools in varying magnitudes, the Fed in principle weighs the inflation risk 
against the probability of recession associated with applying each tool in each possible 
magnitude. Given the high costs associated with either recession or acceleration of inflation, it 
is not surprising that the Fed often moves cautiously, implying relatively small simulated 
changes.  Note that our technique conditional on the model can be easily extended to examine 
explicitly these trade-offs. 
  One final question that remains is whether the policy shocks generated in this 
experiment are consistent with the actual residuals. For example, if the elements of the ε -path 
oscillate in an explosive manner, the issue of "instrument instability" would arise. Thus, a 
comparison of the actual residuals with those required to attain the no-change and rate increase 
paths is appropriate. The actual estimation produced residuals for  the  FFR  equation     
between -1.57 and 2.94.  The average minimum value across the 1000 trials for the no-change 
policy was –2.41 (with a standard deviation of .66, so that the actual minimum was within one 
and a half standard deviations of the average of the simulated values) and the average 
maximum value was .92 (with standard deviation of .51).  Similar figures for the rate increase 
policy were –2.28 (standard deviation of .66) and 1.02 (standard deviation of .50).  The average 
maximum value in the simulations was well below that found in the actual estimation, 
reflecting the fact that the base projection was well above the target path.  Thus the computed ε -
paths are broadly consistent with the actual structural shocks.  Finally, we note that the average 
ratio of the exogenous policy shock to the target value of the interest rate was only .054 for the 
alternative policy and .017 for the no-change policy.  As noted earlier, this is expected for 
normal policymaking. 
  18 
D. The 1998 Cut in the Federal Funds Rate  
  Detailed discussion of Federal Open Market Committee deliberations for  1998 are 
provided by Wheelock (1999). Our experiment compares a no-change policy of 5.50% with a 
policy that cut FFR to 5.25% on September 29, to 5.00% on October 15, and to 4.75% on 
November 17 and then kept FFR at 4.75% through 2002:4.   The FFR target for 1998:4 is set at 
4.92%, a weighted average of the target rates in this quarter, and is set at 4.75% thereafter.   Our 
target path for FFR reflects the recent tendency of the FOMC to gradually change FFR in a 
series of steps, and technically highlights the flexibility of our approach to evaluate general 
target paths, not just constant values for a target variable. 
  Figures 4 and 5 are analogous to Figures 2 and 3.  We see that the cut in FFR leads to an 
increase in Y, P, CP, and both TR and NBR relative to the no-change policy, although the 
effects are relatively small as before.  Although there is little initial effect, Y rises by 
approximately $82 billion by the end of the experiment.  The lag in the effect on P is longer 
than for Y as was the case in our previous experiment.  The effects on CP and TR appear 
quickly although it takes a few quarters for any substantial effect on NBR to appear.  
  The residuals for  the FFR equation from  the estimation  took on  a minimum  value of 
-1.61 and a maximum of 3.05. The average minimum value across the 1000 trials for the no-
change policy was –2.73 (with standard deviation of .51) and the average maximum value was 
.88 (with standard deviation of  .10).  Similar figures for the rate cut policy were –2.87 
(standard deviation of .52) and .36 (standard deviation of .20).  Thus, it appears that the 
technique computes ε -paths roughly consistent with the shocks actually observed.  The average 
ratio of the exogenous policy shock to the point estimate of the interest rate was only -.05 for  19 
the alternative policy and -.041 for the no-change policy, again consistent with normal 
policymaking. 
E. Taylor Rules 
  Taylor (1993) has proposed a simple policy function in which the FFR target responds 
to deviations of output from its potential and to deviations of inflation from a target specified 
by the policymaker. Maintaining high output levels along with low inflation is a time-honored 
policy objective, so this policy function links a key policy instrument to policy goals. Further, 
as argued recently by Judd and Rudebusch (1998), when the Taylor rule is embedded in a 
variety of models, output and inflation are reasonably well controlled.  
  Our implementation of the Taylor rule takes the following form: 
      r  =  p + .5*ygap + .5*(p - p*) + 2, 
where r is the nominal funds rate, where p is the inflation rate for the previous four quarter 
period, where p* is the target inflation rate, and where ygap is the deviation between last 
quarter's actual and potential output.
18  Note that, subtracting p from both sides of the equation, 
we can think of the rule being expressed in terms of the real interest rate. Also note that the real 
interest rate objective of 2% will be attained when output is at potential and when inflation is at 
its target rate. We use the Taylor Rule to generate alternative paths for FFR using last period’s 
actual ygap, last period’s p, and using alternative values of p* of 0, 2, 3, and 4.
19  Given the 
alternative path of FFR for, say, p* = 2, for each trial we compute the ε -path that generates the 
desired FFR path and then compute the paths for the variables in the system conditional on this 
ε -path.  As before, we then compute the mean path of the variables in the system across all 
draws.  20 
  Figure 6 shows the effect of alternative objectives for inflation for the period 1990:1 - 
1992:3 on the non-policy variables in the model. This period, approximately the one focused on 
by Taylor, encompasses the 1990-91 recession and ends with the last data point for which 
Taylor computed ygap. The solid lines in the figure correspond to the mean path over 1000 
draws for the "no change" policy - i.e., a policy aimed at a FFR target of 8.25%, roughly in line 
with the Fed's actual policy objective at the end of 1989.
20 The dashed lines plot the mean paths 
for inflation objectives of 0%, 2%, 3%, and 4%. Consistent with intuition, the more tolerant is 
monetary policy regarding inflation, the higher the path of each of the non-policy variables.  We 
see that for TR and CP the mean paths for the inflation alternatives begin to diverge quickly 
from the no change path; it takes longer for this to occur for NBR, Y, and P.  The effects of the 
alternative policies cause Y to begin to diverge more quickly from the no-change policy than is 
the case for P.  This is consistent with earlier results.     
  As with the previous experiments, we also note the extreme values of the ε -paths 
relative to the magnitudes of the residuals in the estimated model. The maximum residual in the 
interest rate equation for the model estimated over our period of investigation was 2.76; the 
minimum was -1.45. The average maximum elements over the 1000 draws of the ε -paths for 
the no-change, 0%, 2%, 3% and 4% policies were (.96, .46, .13, .-.04, -.19). The average 
minimum elements, in the same order, were (-1.83, -3.03, -3.30, -3.47, -3.70).   The more 
extreme deviations of the average minimum elements from the estimated minimums suggest 
that consideration of policy rules that depart substantially from actual policy (as is the case 
here) is hazardous.  We note that the average ratio of the exogenous policy shock to the point 
estimate of the interest rate was .098, .086, -.009, -.071, and -.148, respectively, for the no- 21 
change, 0%, 2%, 3%, and 4% policies.  These results reinforce concern about whether these 
experiments, especially the ones with higher inflation targets, constitute normal policymaking.   
V. Summary and Conclusion 
The fundamental purpose of this paper is to propose a method for evaluating what 
Leeper and Sims (1994) refer to as normal policy changes within the context of a VAR model.  
The procedure developed can be viewed as a supplement to the evaluation of monetary policy 
changes within the context of a structural model as is currently done in FOMC deliberations. 
Hence the technique can provide additional information about the effects of a proposed policy 
action. The procedure is based on an historical decomposition of the VAR, and the technique 
developed generates a path of structural policy shocks that keep the policy variable at its target 
value.    
Illustrations of how this method can be implemented within a VAR model are provided 
by evaluating the effects of several recent changes in the federal funds rate target on output and 
the price level.  Additionally, the Taylor rule is used to generate target funds rates 
corresponding to different target inflation rates, and the effects of these alternative funds rate 
targets are evaluated. For each policy action considered, a bootstrapping procedure with 1000 
trials is used to generate the expected paths of output and the price level.  For each trial, 
sampling with replacement from the historical shocks is done, so that for each trial, the shocks 
to the nonpolicy variables are typically nonzero.   
The relatively small changes in the federal funds rate for the 1995 and 1998 policy 
actions suggest relatively small effects on both output and the price level.  However, the 
direction of effect for all policy actions is as expected.  After a lag of about a year, modest 
effects on output emerge, but the effects on the price level are still negligible after eight  22 
quarters. The Taylor rule experiment for 1990-1992 suggests a similar lag pattern for output 
and the price level, and the differences between the policy experiment results and the no change 
policy becomes greater as the inflation target rises.  
  The empirical results presented here are conditional on a particular VAR model and a 
particular method of identifying policy shocks.  But the technique proposed is easily 
implemented using other types of VARs, such as those structural VARs that impose short-run 
or long-run constraints.  Consequently, when evaluating monetary policy actions,  it may be 
useful to consider other methods of identifying policy shocks and other VAR models as well as 
more traditional structural models to get more information on the magnitudes of the effects.  23 
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Endnotes 
 
1.  Inclusion of the major reserve market variables allows a detailed consideration of how 
monetary policy actions are implemented.  CP is included to eliminate the “price puzzle” often 
found in VAR models that exclude information about future inflation. 
 
2.  All data (with one exception noted in endnote 18) are from the DRI Basic Economics 
database, and the database name is enclosed in parentheses after the variable description.  Y is 
measured by real gdp (gdpq, chain-weighted real gdp) while P is measured by the chain-
weighted price index for gdp (gdpdfc).  CP is the Commodity Research Bureau's spot market 
index for all commodities (psccom).  Both TR (fmrra) and NBR (fmrnbc) are adjusted for 
reserve requirement changes.  NBR include extended credit in order to avoid the distortions 
created by the Continental Illinois crisis of 1984.  Recent behavior of the reserves series has 
been substantially affected by the widespread adoption of retail sweep accounts in which funds 
from demand deposit accounts are swept into money market deposit accounts, thereby lowering 
required reserves.   To account for this, we estimate two versions of the model. In the first, we 
add a dummy which is zero through 1994:1 and one thereafter, corresponding to actual declines 
in both the reserve aggregates. In the second, we add a dummy variable that is zero through 
1992:4 and one thereafter, corresponding to the fall in the growth rate of TR. Inclusion of these 
dummy variables in the model has only a modest effect on the results for Y and P, but does 
have a larger effect on the other, conditioning variables. The results in Figures 2-6 present the 
results for models including the first dummy.  Results are similar for models including the 
second dummy.  The level of FFR (fyff) is also included in the model. 
 
3.  The assumption that monetary policy alters Y and P only with a lag is not controversial. The 
placement of CP before FFR reflects a desire to allow the monetary authority to respond 
contemporaneously to a variable that contains information about future inflation.  However, the 
assumption that monetary policy affects an auction market variable like CP only with a lag is 
more controversial (McCarthy (1995)). McCarthy (1995) and Rudebusch (1998) have also 
questioned the assumption that the Federal Reserve responds to current period movements in Y 
and P. They contend the Federal Reserve is likely to have only noisy contemporaneous 
information about these variables.  They further point out that using revised data for Y and P 
may have nontrivial effects on the estimates of both structural policy shocks and impulse 
response functions, depending on the nature of any revisions to the initial estimates.  Sims 
(1998), however, questions the quantitative significance of this particular criticism.  Croushore 
and Evans (1999) estimated CEE-type VARs using real-time and revised data over 1960-1983 
and 1968-1998.  They found a high correlation between monetary policy shock measures from 
VARs estimated using real-time and revised data and similar impulse response functions as 
well.  
 
Although the Strongin-type identification scheme used here has some unappealing as well as 
appealing features, it is used since it is a well-understood and widely-employed method of 
identifying monetary policy shocks. 
  27 
4.  In the context of assessing the robustness of alternative identifying restrictions, Faust (1998) 
shows how to impose long-run restrictions such that the persistent fall in prices is eliminated. 
The strength of his approach is that it provides an evaluation of whether such long-run 
restrictions are consistent with available evidence. The example he highlights is whether a 
given model specification, including various restrictions on impulse responses, is consistent 
with an empirical regularity that monetary policy shocks make only a small contribution to the 
variance decomposition of output. 
 
5.  The model in this paper is identified using the Choleski decomposition so that the 
contemporaneous structural model is recursive. In this sense, ε  is a structural shock. As noted 
earlier, our technique may also be applied to  structural VARs such as the Bernanke (1986) or 
Blanchard-Quah (1989) approaches, so that referring to ε  as structural in the current case is 
suggestive of broader applications. Note that with these alternative identifying techniques, the 
vector y in the policy feedback equation can include contemporaneous endogenous variables. 
 
6.  Sims (1982, 1987), and Cooley, LeRoy and Raymon (1984) argue that policy interventions 
implemented by means of altering the "ε -path" are not subject to the Lucas critique. They make 
a further, and stronger, argument: that if agents view the elements of the vector α  as random 
variables rather than literally as parameters, then in principle policy regime shifts can be 
evaluated by optimizing agents in a rational expectations setting as well.  In practice, such 
evaluation would require, among other things, specification of "deep parameters" such as 
technology and preference parameters. Below, we will provide some casual evidence on the ε -
path relative to the endogenous component, α y. 
 
7.  For example, a recent version of the RATS manual notes that multiperiod forecasts 
conditional on future values of endogenous variables depends on “… innovations in all 
variables …” with there being “… many ways to achieve the particular value.  We have only a 
single constraint on a linear combination of [the] variables.” (Doan, p. 8-26). 
 
8.
  We stress again that we start with a generic structural model.  The discussion in the 
remainder of this section applies to this general model, not just the particular model used here 
for illustrative purposes.  
 
9.  See Sims and Zha (1995), Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) and Leeper and Zha (2001) 
for additional discussion and analysis of the distinction between endogenous and exogenous 
policy components. 
 
10.  In our example, D0 is lower triangular with units on the main diagonal.  In other identifying 
schemes neither of these need hold. 
 
11.  Note that if the values for y* follow the actual data, then the system as a whole follows the 
actual path of the data. 
 
12.  In addition to the additive uncertainty obtained when we draw from the actual residuals, it 
is also  possible to incorporate multiplicative uncertainty in the spirit of Brainard (1967) by  28 
using the computed standard errors of the coefficients.  For simplicity, we do not undertake this 
exercise here. 
 
13.  Confidence bands for the simulations can also be constructed.  However, since the base 
projections, the endogenous component of monetary policy, and the shocks to the non-policy 
variables are the same for both the policy experiment and the no change case, it would be 
surprising if the paths from these experiments differed significantly.  Indeed, when confidence 
intervals are constructed for the no change policy, the mean path for the policy experiment 
always lies within these intervals.  We argue that what is important for policymakers is the 
difference between the expected paths for the policy change and the no change policy.   
 
14.
  We compute the forecasted levels taking into account the fact that the the exponential of 
the expected value of the log of the series is not equal to the expectation of the exponential of 
the log. Specifically, we employ the relationship  
E[(exp zt+s)| Ht] = exp[E(zt+s|Ht) + 0.5V(zt+s |Ht  )], 
where z is the log of the variable, Ht is the history of the variable up to time t, and E and V are 
the expectation and variance operators. 
 
15. We use revised data in our analysis rather than the data that would have been available at 
the time of estimation. Use of then-current data would not alter the mechanics of our illustration 
of the technique. It might,  however, alter the policy comparisons being plotted in the figures.  
For example, as noted earlier in endnote 3, Croushore and Evans (1999) found a high 
correlation between monetary policy shock measures from VARs estimated using real-time and 
revised data and similar impulse response functions as well.  On the other hand, Orphanides 
(2000) used real-time data to estimate a Taylor-Rule equation and compared these estimates to 
Taylor-Rule estimates based on revised data.  He found substantial differences in the fitted 
values of the federal funds rate using different vintages of data.  In particular, he found the 
fitted values of the funds rate from the Taylor-Rule equation estimated using real-time data 
were close to the actual values of the funds rate.  In contrast, fitted values from the equation 
estimated using revised data were systematically different from the actual values in the late 
1960s and 1970s.  Specifically the fitted values in this period suggest the inflation of the 1970s 
could have been avoided if the Taylor-Rule had been followed.  However, this inference is not 
warranted when the Taylor Rule is estimated using real-time data since the fitted values were 
very similar to the actual FFR values. These two studies suggest that using real-time versus 
revised data may matter more for some applications than others.  
 
16. As indicated in footnote 10, for other identification schemes like Bernanke (1986) or 
Blanchard-Quah (1989),  
1
, 0 ) (
−
ii d  is not necessarily equal to 1. 
 
17.  This assumes that  1, 1 i d is not “too large”.  
 
18.  Potential output is computed by the Congressional Budget Office and was downloaded 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis web site. 
         29 
Alternative policy rules like an x-percent rule for money growth without feedback are evaluated 
in Fackler and McMillin (1998).   
 
19.  Judd and Rudebusch (1998) provide further discussion of the rule if the weights are 
estimated rather than being arbitrarily assumed to equal both to each other and to .5. They also 
discusss the assumption that the real rate objective is 2%. 
 
20.  The Fed has specified a "monitoring range" for the funds rate of 6 - 10%. The rate in 
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